|
Rafael
López-Pintor, International Political Consultant
Nationalization of Election Administration
|
Dear Colleagues and Conference Participants,
The nationalization of election administration
under the aegis of the international community in post-conflict
societies should be placed at the crossroads of two most recent
political development of the post-cold war period. On the one hand,
peacekeeping operations and democracy development have been accompanied
by increasing international support at electoral assistance (political,
financial and technical). On the other hand, an institutional prototype
of election administration is taking the lead worldwide in the form
of electoral commissions, which are independent from the executive
branch of government, have a permanent nature and are staffed with
professional civil servants.
It is the contention of this presentation that
challenges and prospects for nationalization of election administration
in a given polity should be envisaged in the light of those wider
developments, which are taking place worldwide. In fact, they are
the lessons learned from a variety of experiences which would allow
for a correct assessment of the magnitude of relevant transitional
problems in a given election administration (i.e. scope of the authority
of electoral bodies, independence and neutrality in conducting elections,
recruitment and salary structure of electoral officials, and cost
of elections).
A conclusion is reached in the sense that the
quality of a new national election administration would very much
depend on the institutional shape it takes and its organizational
structure. These factors will largely determine the neutrality,
managerial capacity and operational costs of the electoral bodies,
which, in their turn, will affect the legitimacy of the democratic
regime, and the likelihood for periodically held genuine democratic
elections.
The Role of International Assistance to Elections
In the post-cold war democratization environment,
elections and electoral management have transcended national borders
to become an international endeavor in a variety of ways: a) political,
financial and technical assistance from donor governments and international
organizations (often coupled with election observer missions, long
and short term); b) professional networking among electoral authorities
from various countries and regions of the world; and c) development
of a corpus of normative orientations (rules and guidelines) on
the what and how of genuine democratic electoral practice.
The international community has played different
roles in democratization processes of different countries. Its intervention
has generally been considered effective in facilitating the democratization
process and, in particular, the establishment of electoral bodies.
In the context of peacekeeping operations, the international community
has sometimes taken over the organization of elections (i.e. the
1993 UN mission in Cambodia, and the current OSCE missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and in Kosovo, and Eastern Slavonia). In other cases, a high profile
role was played in the organization of elections in the context
of the application of peace accords (i.e. Namibia, Nicaragua, El
Salvador, Mozambique, Liberia and Haiti). More common situations
involve international financial and technical assistance to national
authorities for the organization of elections in emerging and new
democracies.
A different, but related phenomenon is the recent
expansion of international professional associations of electoral
authorities in several regions of the world. In the Americas, a
number of such organizations exist: the Association of Electoral
Institutions of Central America and the Caribbean (Asociacion de
Organizaciones Electorales de America Central y el Caribe), created
under the so-called Protocol of Tikal; the Association of Latin
American Electoral Tribunals, created under the so-called Protocol
of Quito; and the Inter-American Union of Electoral Institutions
(Union Interamericana de Organismos Electorales), which integrates
the former two associations and includes also Mexico, the United
States and Canada. In democratizing eastern and central Europe as
well as Africa, associations were recently created under the auspices
of the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES): the
Association of Central and Eastern European Elections Officials
(ACEEEO), established in 1991, and the Association of African Election
Authorities (AAEA), which was endorsed by 14 countries of the region
and established in 1997. In Asia, there is the Association of Asia
Election Authorities (AAEA). In the Pacific region, there is an
Association of Pacific Islands, Australia and New Zealand Electoral
Administrators (PIANZEA). In addition, there is also a Commonwealth
Association of Election Officers, and two U.S.-based international
bodies: the International Association of Clerks, Recorders, Election
Officials and Treasurers (IACREOT), and the International Institute
for Municipal Clerks (IIMC). Last but not least, there is this Association
of Election Officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina (AEOBiH). All these
associations have been active in organizing regional conferences
and workshops for election officials.
Finally, relevant documents with guidelines
on the conduct of elections setting international standards of good
practice have been developed, issued or endorsed among others by
international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), the
European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE), the British Commonwealth, and the International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Moreover,
field reports from international assistance agencies such as United
Nations Development Program (UNDP), the International Foundation
for Election Systems (IFES), and the National Democratic Institute
for International Affairs (NDI) almost unanimously point in the
same direction.
The Importance of Election Management Bodies
The crucial importance of election management
bodies in the establishment and consolidation of democracy could
hardly be overstated. In a discussion paper recently published by
UNDP and authored by myself, two main arguments are presented. First,
electoral management bodies (EMBs) worldwide are increasingly shaped
according to a model of electoral commissions that are both permanent
and independent from the executive branch. Second, electoral administration
that relies on permanent and professional staff is more cost-effective
than ad hoc electoral bodies or commissions comprising exclusively
temporary staff. Significant empirical evidence in support of these
arguments is presented.
Regarding the first argument, the direction
of constitutional and electoral reform worldwide provides conclusive
evidence that independent and permanent electoral commissions that
are fully responsible for the conduct of elections constitute the
most favoured model of electoral administration. This is followed,
though at a distance, by a model in which the government runs the
election, but a supervisory independent commission exists with some
regulatory, surveillance and adjudication capacities on the conduct
of elections. Under both models of electoral administration, the
commissions are frequently composed totally or partly of representatives
of political parties. Elections run exclusively by the executive
branch constitute a category grounded more on historical reasons
than on current needs. This paper presents a taxonomy that classifies
148 countries by region of the world, according to the type of electoral
administration.
Historically speaking, elections exclusively
managed by the executive branch are a residual category, not only
in number, but also as a developmental pattern. Of the 27 most stable
democracies in the second half of this century, only seven countries
have this type of electoral authority, all of them in north-western
Europe, plus Switzerland, and they constitute 25% of all older democracies.
A different pattern emerges in the remaining countries, where democracy
was established later or where a transition to democracy is in progress.
In this latter group, only one out of five countries has elections
run exclusively by the executive branch. In contrast to countries
with a longer democratic tradition and a centralized government-that
is, countries in continental Europe and former colonies either from
the French centralized tradition or in the British Commonwealth-government-run
elections are very unlikely in new democracies. Furthermore, electoral
reform in newly democratic societies and in some older democracies
almost invariably moves in the direction of establishing, at least
in law, independent electoral commissions, either with full responsibility
for the electoral process or with supervisory powers over elections
run by the executive branch.
Patterns of Electoral Administration Worldwide
| Institutional Models |
North America, Western Europe (%) |
Latin America, Caribbean (%) |
Asia and the Pacific (%) |
Middle East and the Magreb (%) |
East and Central Europe (%) |
Sub-Saharan Africa (%) |
TOTAL (%) |
Number of Cases per Institutional Model |
| Government runs the elections |
43 |
12 |
30 |
45 |
- |
8 |
20 |
29 |
| Government under supervisory authority |
43 |
18 |
7 |
33 |
33 |
39 |
27 |
40 |
| Independent electoral commission |
14 |
70 |
63 |
22 |
67 |
53 |
53 |
79 |
| TOTAL |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
|
| Number of cases per region |
21 |
34 |
30 |
9 |
18 |
36 |
148 |
148 |
Source: UNDP. 2000. Electoral Management Bodies
as Institutions of Governance. Pg. 25
Cost and Operation of an Electoral Administration
Concerning the second argument, that permanent
electoral bodies with a staff of professionals are more efficient
than temporary bodies, some conclusive evidence is provided by variations
in electoral budgets (average cost per elector) relative to the
duration of their experience in organizing elections. Some preliminary
conclusions can be drawn from the data of some 50 countries collected
for that paper. One main factor in cost variations worth mentioning
is the extent of previous experience with multi-party elections.
Significant discrepancies exist among the costs of elections in
stable democracies, those in transitional systems, and those that
take place in the context of special peacekeeping operations. Elections
in countries with more experience of multi-party elections are consistently
less costly than in those where multi-party elections constitute
a new undertaking. Interestingly enough, this tends to be the case
regardless of the region of the world, the level of economic development
and whether elections were interrupted by periods of military rule.
As a statistical trend, the least costly elections are held in countries
with lengthy electoral experience: the United States and most western
European countries; Chile, Costa Rica and Brazil in Latin America;
Botswana and Kenya in Africa; India and Pakistan in Asia; and Australia.
At the other extreme, elections held as part of broader peacekeeping
operations, as could be expected, are the costliest.
Getting a world average would pay little tribute
to reality and be of no great help for interpretation. The average
cost per registered voter varies from around $0.50 in Ethiopia,
Georgia and Pakistan to around $10 and over for elections in Angola,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Palestine and South Africa.
Most of the remaining countries lie somewhere in between and around
three main clusters: those with costs per elector close to $1 like
the United States, most Western European countries, some of Latin
America and Africa; those with costs close to $3, like most of Latin
America, some of Africa, and some of Asia and the Pacific; and,
finally, countries with costs ranging around $5 to $6, like Switzerland,
Mexico, Cambodia in 1998, Kenya and Liberia. Thus, election costs
vary not only between countries of different regions but also within
any one region of the world.
Different from costs but not independently from
them, there are other important questions at the managerial/technical
level, such as these: how extensive a bureaucratic organization
is required for effective and efficient conduct of the polls? Which
would be more suitable - a centralized or decentralized organization?
What is the role of new technologies in election management? In
a summary way, some tentative answers can be advanced.
On bureaucracy: it is not as important to have
a large organization as it is to have an administrative machine
that is adequate to the political, geographic, and financial circumstances
of the country. Less debatable is the question of permanence and
professionalism (endurance, standardized recruitment and training
procedures, etc.). The maintenance of a civil service type of organization
has historically proved more effective and efficient than ad hoc
bodies in practically all fields of collective services involving
large populations and the massive use of resources. How could it
be different with elections?
On the concentration of authority: whatever
the model of administration formally defined in the law, two main
factors necessitate a measure of decentralization. The first is
the massive nature of elections, the second, the holding of local
elections in almost every democracy. A rule of thumb in this domain
would be that of centralized authority and decentralized management.
Finally, on the use of new telecommunications
and computer technologies: these are here to stay, if only because
of their declining costs and ever-growing capacities. By their mere
existence, they put pressure on the administration of elections
at its different stages: registration, voting, and counting; not
to speak of office management. Nevertheless, new technologies by
themselves will not improve the integrity and acceptability of electoral
systems-lack of transparency and mistrust must also be overcome.
It would always be wise to take into consideration the condition
of the political process before adopting any new technology, most
importantly, by including the political stakeholders in the decision
making process, as well as in the application of the new technologies.
Lessons Learned
Among lessons learned from recent experience
as recorded by the aforementioned paper are the following:
- As electoral commissions prove to be vital for the sustainability
of democratic government, they would be better protected legally
if enshrined in constitutions rather than regulated only by ordinary
law.
- Electoral legislation, including the status and composition
of electoral bodies, is more widely accepted and effective when
all political parties participate in its drafting.
- An electoral authority can be party-based and still operate
neutrally and independently. Where there is no other tradition
or existing body of widely respected and independent civil servants,
a multi-party composition may better guarantee a balanced approach.
A mixture of judges and political party representatives or nominees
is common both in electoral commissions of new democracies and
in the supervisory bodies of countries where elections are managed
by the Ministry of Interior or Home Affairs.
- Strong leadership by electoral bodies is important particularly
at the early stage of democratization.
- Commissions with a very large membership are usually less effective
and efficient than bodies with a smaller number of commissioners.
- Experience with multi-party elections clearly facilitates the
introduction of cost-effective administration of the polls; this
is an unequivocal lesson stemming from the experience of managing
elections, in favour of permanent electoral bodies as repositories
of managerial capacities.
- The question of the role of permanent commissions between election
periods is frequently raised in consolidating democracies. During
these intervals, commissions should maintain and update voter
lists, develop regulations, organize by-elections and eventually
hold mid-term local elections. Other activities can center on
voter and civic education programs and training of party cadres.
- It is important to avoid using the electoral administration
as an employment program. The system should be devised with a
view towards sustainability, and therefore should correspond to
the limited financial capabilities of the national government.
- Political mistrust is expensive. The greater the breach of confidence
among contenders at the polls, particularly following civil unrest,
the more expensive an election tends to become. Such cases often
require expensive measures, such as parallel electoral/surveillance
bodies, high-quality ballot materials, financial incentives to
the parties, and costly international observer missions. Paradoxically,
investment in independent permanent commissions to dispel mistrust
by parties can directly reduce some of these other types of costs.
How Difficult is Transition from International
to National Election Management?
A host of problems arise on the transition
road towards a national administration. There are no two countries
whose experiences are equal to each other, and on top of that there
are not so many places where an international administration was
directly and fully in charge of elections (i.e. Cambodia, Bosnia
Herzegovina, Eastern Slavonia, and Kosovo). This notwithstanding,
there are some problems in common among these cases and also between
the later and those where the international community had a heavy
presence in the running of elections (i.e. several countries in
Central America, Eastern Europe and Southern Africa). These problems
are most often related with the design of the institutional model,
operational costs and the development of a civil service type of
election staff (recruitment, training, salaries and career development
patterns). Most of these have already been summarily dealt with
earlier in this presentation. I will just list some of them now
and have them briefly commented for the sake of further discussion.
- Transfer of responsibility and authority:
An incremental approach is recommended for the discussion, decision
and implementation of the institutional design. All relevant political
actors should be involved in the exercise.
- Securing the non-politicization of
administration: This should refer not to acting in a partisan
manner rather than letting the political parties totally outside
of, or uninvolved in the election administration. A variety of
institutional and operational patterns can be taken into consideration,
and yet the principle remains that the main players in elections
should have influence regarding who conducts elections and how
elections are conducted.
- Education of national staff: civil
service experiences in this and other countries shall be taken
into account for the development of a body of national professional
electoral officials. International assistance may be welcome for
this development.
- A salary structure for normal times
of a national civil administration: the rule of thumb is that
permanent electoral officials shall be paid according to same
or similar standards than the bulk of civil servants. Electoral
officers hired for the electoral period or just the polling operation
are usually subject to either common labor contract or per diem
payments.
There is still the all-encompassing question
of how would it be possible to maintain the same quality of election
administration when the election budget is a fraction of that of
the international administration, OSCE or another? Letting aside
the burning point of how high quality has been characterizing the
international administration of election operations, three main
points could be brought about in responding the all-encompassing
question:
First, quality electoral administration
is not necessarily related (and rather probably unrelated) to high
expenditure electoral budgets. Reference can be made to a large
number of cases included in the UNDP Discussion Paper (India and
Uruguay among others can be considered as proverbially illustrative
to the point). On a massive scale, it is the stability of the democratic
system and the experience at organizing elections that make election
administration high quality and cost effective.
Second, more specifically, integrated,
strategic and operational planning are cost reducing management
tools easily available today for the electoral authorities of any
country.
Third, the single most important cost-cutting
measure is probably continuous voter registration, which is made
easier after the first or second elections.
Concluding Remark
There are no simple answers to the challenges
facing the development of a national election administration. It
all depends on the basic conditions of state and democracy building,
(both political and organizational) as much as on the will for developing
strategic definitions and organization models suitable to needs
(objective and perceived) in the electoral arena. Some clues in
this domain are: a) sensitivity to the cleavage structure and political
pluralism of the polity; b) following an incremental approach to
problem solving; c) being open to the mood of the times (independent,
permanent and professional commission is the model). How successful
could one be? Only time and experience will definitely tell. For
the time being, quite encouraging answers seem to emerge from ongoing
research on the historical development of electoral bodies as well
as on the relationship between the quality of an electoral administration
and the legitimization of democratic government and the continuing
prospects for genuine democratic elections.
Question and Answer Session
Q: Is it possible to outline any significant
correlation between the number of registered voters and the number
of administrators engaged in the election administration?
A: The size of an election administration
varies a lot according to many relations. For example, the distress
characterizing the political environment is one important parameter.
We cannot say that you need a certain number of permanent administrators
per voters, as this depends so much on the political dimension involved.
Election officers in most countries are simply citizens who are
chosen - or forced by law - to participate in elections. There are,
however, situations where even people at the basic level (e.g. polling
station level) will have to be paid and carefully chosen. Why is
that? It is usually because of political reasons. Let me mention
a recent example. In Mexico, the last 3-4 elections have been increasingly
democratic. In the last election the Mexican Election Commission
decided to cut through all discussions concerning the selection
of impartial election administrators as the selection process was
developing into a difficult and politically tense problem. The Election
Commission simply said: lets avoid all the complications associated
with the selection of administrators - all Mexicans born in April
should register with the Election Commission and take up their duty
as administrator. It worked and all talk and rumors about favoritism
ended.
Q: What can we learn from other countries where the international
community has been in charge of elections?
A: It is difficult to draw lessons from
cases like Cambodia and Kosovo as they are very different from each
other. It would probably make more sense to draw on experiences
from the many places where the international community has been
heavily involved in supervision - Namibia, Nicaragua, South Africa,
Mozambique, etc. In general the experience with heavily international
involvement in elections is positive. The important thing to keep
in mind is that the presence of the international community can
help deter violence and build confidence into the election process.
A supervisory role is probably as effective - if not more - than
having the international community running the elections completely.
I'm not blaming the international community, but only trying to
convey the message: the less the international community is involved
in running the elections the better for the electoral process it
is.
Q: What kind of registration system would be suitable for BiH?
A: This is a difficult, but important,
question. In most countries the registration data is generated automatically
through monthly/yearly submission - often by municipalities - of
data to the election commission. The model to be developed in BiH
must rely on existing registers available to the administration.
The voter register must be integrated into an existing register.
A separate system for registration of voters is not viable. It should
be mentioned here that police records are seldom linked to a wider
registration system for a good reason.
|
|
|